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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellants David and Margaret Fisk ("Fisk" or "Fisks") filed a complaint asserting a
single claim of medical negligence against Respondent Nmih Idaho Day Survery, LLC dba
Northwest Specialty Hospital ("NWSH") and its agents and employees, Respondent Dr.
Jeffery D. McDonald ("Dr. McDonald"), and Dr. John L. Pennings ("Dr. Pennings"). 1 At the
conclusion of discovery and expert witness disclosures, Dr. Pennings was voluntarily
dismissed upon stipulation and the Respondents moved for summary judgment. The District
Court determined that the Fisks failed to present an expert with actual knowledge of the local
standard of health care practice applicable to Respondents' treatment and entered judgment in
their favor.

The District Court denied the Fisks' motion for reconsideration of those

judgments. In deciding both motions, the District Court considered all expert declarations
filed by the Fisks. It found that despite repeated attempts, the Fisks failed to present expert
testimony demonstrating actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice
concerning Mrs. Fisk's treatment. The Fisks appealed.

On appeal, the Fisks advance three primary arguments. The first is a strict question of
law: whether this Court should overturn I. C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and Idaho precedent to rule
that the moving party to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment must, as a condition

1

Appellant David Fisk is Ivfrs. Fisk's husband. It is undisputed that his claims are derivative of Mrs.
Fisk's claims. (R. 17)
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precedent to filing such motion, affirmatively show he or she complied with the local standard
of health care practice applicable to his or her treatment of the plaintiff by admissible expert
testimony. The second and third arguments are whether the District Court abused its discretion
by ti nding that the Fis ks' experts failed to satisfy the foundational requirements of I. C. § § 61012 and 6-1013 at the time it granted the Respondents ' motions for summary judgment and
later denied the Fi sks ' motion for reconsideration of the same.

B.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings.

1.

The Statement of Facts recited in paragraph 1 of Appellant's Brief accurately

describes the facts the District Court accepted as true concerning the care and treatment of
Mrs. Fisk from the time Dr. McDonald performed a cervical spinal fusion on Mrs. Fisk on
March 10, 2015, to the time a portion of Mrs. Fisk's bowel was removed by Dr. Pennings on
March 12, 2015.2
2.

On March 1, 2017, the Fisks filed their Complaint alleging that NWSH was

negligent and vicariously liable for the acts of its agents and employees regarding the care and
treatment of Mrs. Fisk; and that Drs. McDonald and Pennings were neg! igent for the care they
provided to Mrs. Fisk. (R. 17.) The Complaint was never amended. The Complaint did not

2

NWSH argued and presented evidence that the Mrs. Fisk's ischemic bowel was not related to the
cervical spine surgery performed by Dr. McDonald on March 10, 2015, she had no known predictive
risk factors for the condition, there was no reason to suspect or guard against its occurrence postoperatively, and in any event, Dr. Penning's surgery was successful and saved her life. (R. 846-862.)
In granting all facts and inferences in favor of the Fisks, however, the District Court did not consider
this evidence. (R. 1829, generally.)

-2-

allege that NP Sholtz was negligent; that Dr. McDonald was vicariously liable for NP Sholtz' s
conduct; that an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship existed between NP Shol tz
and Dr. McDonald; or that any person or entity is vicariously liable for NP Sholtz's acts or
onuss10ns. (R. 17; generally, R. 1883-1884; and R. 2179-2180.).3
3.

On August 22, 2017, the District Court issued its Scheduling Order, Notice of

Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order setting trial for September 10, 2018 and providing that
expert witnesses must be disclosed as follows:
Not later than [January 16, 2018] (34 weeks) before trial, plaintiff(s) shall
disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later than [March 15, 2018] (26
weeks) before trial, Defendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial.
Such disclosure shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26 (b)(4)(A)(i). Notice of Compliance of all disclosures
shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court.

(R. 124) (Emphasis added).

4.

NWSH served written discovery upon the Fisks; the Fisks served written

discovc1y upon NWSH and Dr. McDonald. NWSH and Dr. McDonald responded to the Fisks '
written discovery on September 17, 2017 (R. 193) and August 28, 2017 (R. 1478),
respectively. The Fisks did not object to Respondents ' collective discovery responses, and it
is undisputed that the Fisks were able to timely obtain the information sought through written
discovery.

3

As noticed by the District Court, although the Complaint alleged NWSH was vicariously liable for
the conduct of its agents/employees, it did not include any similar allegations with respect to Dr.
McDonald. R. 17, Complaint ,;,r 3 and 43 (in re Hospital) with i1i14 and 47 (in re Dr. McDonald); sec
also R. 1883.)
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5.

Following receipt of responses to their written discovery, it is undisputed that

the Fisks -were able to depose all witnesses they deemed necessary. They deposed NWSH
nurses Pamela Carpenter, Robin Hetzler, and Colleen Miller on November 13-14, 2017 (R.

1502, 1503, and 1504); Dr. Pennings on November 14, 2017 (R. 1505); Dr. McDonald on
November 20, 2017 (R. 1506); and Jessica Sholtz, NP on December 1, 2017 (R. 1507).
6.

The documents and records on file with the District Court and lodged with this

Court demonstrate the Fisks were afforded sufficient time to pursue discovery, pursued
discovery, and were able to timely obtain the information they requested during discovery. (R.
1459.)
7.

On June 14, 2017, the Fisks responded to NWSH's First Set of Interrogatories

and Requests for Production of Documents. (R. 15 09.) In response to the request to provide
the qualifications, substance of facts and opinions, and further information relative to their
experts, the Fisks answered as follows:

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Objection. This interrogatory
seeks attorney work product, mental impressions, conclusions, trial strategy and
legal theories of counsel (IRCP 26(b)(3)(B)[]. This re~ponse shall be
supplemented and experts shall be disclosed in accordance with the deadlines
set forth by the Court governing the disclosure of expert witnesses.
(R. 1516) (Emphasis added.)
8.

The fisks timely served their Expert Witness Disclosures on January 16, 2018.

(R. 722.) The disclosure included repo11s for each of her four designated standard of care
experts: APRN Vernon Kubiak ("Kubiak"), Timothy Hawkins ("Ha\vkins"), Dr. Robert Y.
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Uyeda ("Uyeda"), and FNP Suzanne Nebeker ("Nebeker"). None of the disclosed expe1is
were local providers.
9.

The Respondents timely disclosed their experts; and the Fisks did not, and do

not on appeal, asse1i any error or impropriety related to such disclosures.

10.

On January 26, 2018, the District Court entered an Order of Dismissal with

Prejudice of John L. Pennings, M.D. upon stipulation of the parties. (R. 469.)

11.

On April 3, 2018, NWSH filed a Motion to Strike Fisk's Expert Witness

Disclosure and Motion to Exclude Fisks' Experts (R. 687) and a Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 843). Dr. McDonald filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 24, 2018.
(R. 1452.)

These motions were noted for hearing on May 23, 2018, providing the Fisks

adequate time to respond. (R. 674 and 1455.)

11. 1. Dr. McDonald's Motion for Summary Judgment clarified that none of the
Fisks ' experts, with the possible exception of Uyeda, appeared to be critical of his care
whatsoever. 4

4

In his expert report, Dr. Uyeda opined that "[t]he medical providers(s) caring for Ms. Fisk during
her hospitalization at NWSH failed to timely investigate and treat her acute onset of unexplained
severe abdominal pain" and provided other broad-stroke criticisms generic to all defendants
(including, it appeared, then-dismissed Dr. Pennings). (R. 782-784.) Dr. Uyeda failed to identify
what each of the "medical provider(s)" did or failed to do, what they should have done differently,
what they could have done differently, when they should/could have done something differently, or
how they violated the applicable standard of health care practice; nor did Dr. Uyeda make any attempt
to articulate knowledge oflocal standard or the otherwise establish the foundational elements of LC.
§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 (Id.) He mereIy identified that the basis for his opinions were "medical
knowledge common to all medical practitioners" and "common sense," among other generic bases.
(Id. (underlines in original).) The report of Mr. Kubiak identified various regulations that may have
-5-

12.

The Fisks timely responded to those Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 1540

and 1565) with the support of declarations and previously-disclosed reports from their standard
of care experts Ms. N ebeker (R. 1619), Hawkins (R. 1659), Uyeda (R. 1679), and Kubiak (R.
1691 ). The Fisks did not seek a Rule 56 continuance.
13.

Dr. McDonald and NWSH timely filed reply memoranda in support of their

dispositive motions. (R. 1725 and 1745, respectively.) The Respondents asked the District
Court to disregard the Fisks standard of care expe1i testimony that was not disclosed properly
under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) at the time of their expert witness disclosure. Alternatively, the
Respondents asserted the Fisks expe1is failed to satisfy the foundational elements required by
LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.
14.

At the May 23 , 2018 hearing, the District Court addressed the merits of whether

the plaintiffs ' experts satisfied the foundation required to render a standard of care opinion
pursuant to I. C. § § 6-1012 and 6-1013; and the District Court observed and confirmed that the
Fisks were not desirous of a Rule 56(d) continuance. (R. 1803.)
15 .

On May 31, 2018, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and

Order: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Hospital 's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Expert

been relied upon by Dr. Uyeda; however, this was too attenuated to provide any understanding of
whether such regulations were relied upon by Dr. Uyeda or themselves sufficient to establish the
requisite foundation pursuant to§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and, Kubiak's opinion appeared to apply, at
most, to nurses at NWSH. (R. 747-758.) Because the Appellants' Brief only asserts error of the
District Court's decision to enter judgment in favor of Dr. McDonald based upon the testimony of
Ms. Nebeker, the deficiencies of Dr. Uyeda s opinion are not addressed in this Respondent's Brief.
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Witness Disclosure; Granting Ho::,pital 's Motion

for

Summary Judgment; and Granting

McDonald's Motion.for Summary Judgment ("MSJ Order"). (R. 1829.) The MSJ Order noted
that the Fisks failed to offer expert testimony sufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment in a medical malpractice case; specifically, none of the Fisks' experts, including Ms.
Nebeker, were critical of Dr. McDonald or familiar with the local standard of care applicable
to any of the Respondents (or relative to NP Sholtz). (Td.)
16.

The District Court entered judgments dismissing N\VHS and McDonald with

prejudice on June 7, 2018 (R. 1894) and June 8, 2018 (R. 1912), respectively.
17.

On June 21, 2018, the Fisks filed a Motion for Recons idcration of the judgment

entered in favor ofNWSH (R. l 924) and a Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment entered
in favor of Dr. McDonald (R. 1991). These motions were supported by second declarations
from Ms. Neheker (R. 1941), Kubiak (R. 1953), and Hawkins (R. 1971). While Ms. Nebeker
was critical of NP Sholtz, NWSH and an unnamed intensivist, she was not critical of Dr.
McDonald. None of the other experts presented by the Fisks were critical of Dr. McDonald.
18.
Order.

The Fisks ' motions to reconsider did not dispute the authority cited in the MSJ

(R. 1924 and 1991, generally.) The Fisks' motion sought to vacate the judgment

dismissing Dr. McDonald on two grounds: first, by arguing that Dr. McDonald was the
supervisor for NP Sholtz liable for her acts and omissions; and second, that NP Sholtz was
negligent. (R. 1994-1997.) The first argument failed to address the plain language of the
Complaint or the District Court's reasoning that Dr. McDonald could not be liable under the
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governing pleading for the acts of NP Sholtz. The second argument was supported by three
sentences: "Jessica Sholtz's negligence has been addressed in detail in Plaintiffa'prior filings.
For convenience, the most recent Second Declaration of Suzanne Nebeker is attached and
incorporated in its entirety into this filing pertaining to Dr. McDonald. To the extent that
Jessica Sholtz provided substandard care to Margaret Fisk, Dr. McDonald is responsible." (R.
1994.)
19.

The Second Declaration of Suzanne Nebeker restated the broad-brush

conclusory criticisms of the Hospital and its staff and nurses, NP Sholtz, and an intensivist
(who is not a party to this lawsuit) based upon IDAPA regulations and nursing standards. (R.

1941, generally.)

lt represented that Ms. Nebeker communicated with certain medical

providers regarding the local standard of care, but it did not identify how or if those providers
had actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care, what info1mation those providers
conveyed, or how Ms. Nebeker could have acquired actual knowledge of the local standard of
care from those providers that was applicable to the Respondents, NP Sholtz, or the intensivist.
(R. 1950-1951.)
20.

Dr. McDonald filed his Opposition to Fisks' Motion for Reconsideration on

August 15, 2018 (R. 2057), supported by the Declaration of Ms. Wagner attesting that she did
not provide infonnation to Ms. Nebeker that would facilitate familiarity with the local standard
of care relative to this case. (R. 2073.)
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21.

Dr. McDonald filed a Memorandum of Costs and supporting Affidavit of

Counsel for Rule 54(d)(l)(C) costs as a matter of right of$2,972.58 and for Rule 54(d)(l)(D)
discretionary costs of $6,934.56.

The Fisks filed an objection only with respect to Dr.

McDonald's request for discretionary costs and as noted by the District Cou1t, did not object
to costs as a matter of right. (R. 2188.)
22.

The District Court heard Fisks' Motion for Reconsideration and all other

pending motions on October 10, 2018 and issued its Memorandum Decision and Order

Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint; Denying Plaintiffs' Motions for
Reconsideration,· and Order Regarding Fees and Costs on November 13, 2018 ("Rccon.
Order"). (R. 2171.) In the Recon. Order, the Dist1ict Court found that the "new" evidence
submitted by the Fisks failed to present admissible evidence to show actual knowledge of the
local standard of health care practice applicable to Respondents; consequently, the Declaration
of Ms. Wagner was moot.
23.

On December 3, 2018, the District Com1 entered an Amended Judgment Re Dr.

McDonald dismissing the Complaint against him with prejudice and awarding him costs of
suit in the amount of $2,972.58. (R. 2196)
24.

The Fisks timely appealed the District Court's MSJ Order regarding the decision

to dismiss NWSH and Dr. McDonald and the District Court's Rccon. Order regarding its
affinnation ofjudgment in favor ofNWSH and Dr. McDonald. The Appellants' Brief presents
six arguments on appeal, which can be summarized as follows: (1) whether the District Court

-9-

erred in granting Respondents ' motions for summary judgment based upon their argument the
Respondents were required to present admissible expert testimony as a condition precedent to
show they complied with the appl icablc standard of care; (2) whether the District Court abused
its discretion by finding that Fisks failed to present expert testimony adequate to oppose the
Respondents ' motions for summary; (3) whether District Court abused its discretion in failing
to consider the Fisks' supplemental filings in support of their motion to reconsider - this issue

is in error because the District Court did consider those supplemental filings; (4) whether Dr.
McDonald is responsible for the acts and omissions of NP Sholtz; (5) whether the District
Court erred in granting Respondents their costs as a matter of right; and ( 6) whether the Fisks
are entitled to their costs and attorney fees on appeal. Appellant's Brief concedes that Dr.
McDonald was not independently negligenl; 5 rather, they assert he was liable solely by
reference to Ms. Ncbcker' s testimony relative to NP Sholtz. Consequently, Dr. McDonald will
not address the District Court's treatment of the testimony of the Fisks' remaining standard of
care experts.

The District Court noted that "[t]he Fisks have not responded to Dr. McDonald's argument that they
failed to disclose an expert opinion or offer into evidence an expert opinion critical of his treatment
and care of Margaret. This Cou1t's own review of the opinions submitted by the Fisks' retained
experts reveal no criticisms of Dr. McDonald's treatment and care of Margaret. The opinions further
fail to articulate the applicable standard of care for a neurosurgeon at an acute care facility in Post
Falls, Idaho in March of2015." (R. 1881.)
j
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II.

Attorney Fees on Appeal
Dr. McDonald requests the Court to affinn the costs as a matter ofright he was awarded

by the District Court pursuant to Rule 54(d)( l )(C). These costs were entered without objection
from the Fisks. (R. 2188.)
Dr. McDonald requests costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 and
Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. The Fisks' first argument would require this
Court to overturn decades of precedent applying the plain language of Rule 56(c) and LC.
§ § 6-1012 and 6-1013; Fisks' second argument asks this Court to second-guess the District
Court's evidcntiary ruling. Consequently, fees are proper pursuant to Section 12-12 l. Elec:.

Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 828, 41 P.3d 242 (2001) (awarding fees
pursuant to Section 12-121 where appellant asked this Court to reconsider findings of fact,
including the lower court's weighing of evidence, without asserting significant legal questions)
(internal citations omitted).

III.

Standard of Review

A.

Standard of review on motions for summary judgment.

The Idaho Supreme Court applies the same standard of review used by the lower court
to rule on a motion for summary judgment. Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 15 3 Idaho 801, 291
P.3d 1000 (2012). Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, the cou1t "must grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). Supporting and opposing motions must cite to
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facts in the record or otherwise show that SLtch materials do not establish the presence or
absence of a material fact. T.R. C. P. 56( c). The opposing party cannot rest upon mere al legations
or denials, but the party 's response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. I.R.C.P. 56(e); See e.g. Smith v. Meridian

Joint Schoof District No. 2, 128 ldaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 4 77 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment
rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses."); Sparks v. St.

Luke'sReg'!Med. Ctr. , 115 Idaho 505, 509, 768 P.2d 768,772 (1988) (applying Celotex to
affirm summary judgment entered in favor a medical malpractice defendant). For dispositive

issues on which "the nonnwving party will bear the burden ofproofat trial ... , a summary
judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. "'; the nonmoving party must then "go
beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissio11s on .file,' designate 'spec~fic facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial."' Celotex C01p., 477 U.S. at 323-24 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added) (expressly ruling that it was error to require the moving party to make an affim1ative
evidentiary showing on an element the non-moving party was required to show in his or her
case in chief). The Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed and adopted the holding of Celotex to
dispositivc motions brought under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Thomson v. Idaho ins.

Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994) (A moving party is
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"entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial." (citing Celotex Cmp., 477 U.S. at 322.

B.

Standard of review re trial court's evidentiarv rulings.

The admissibility of evidence is a threshold question left to the sound discretion of the
district court. Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834 838, 153 P.3d 1180 L184
(2007); Lepper v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 160 Idaho 104,108,369 P.3d 882,886 (2016). This
discretionary standard applies to the lower court's detennination of the admissibility of expert
testimony in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l

Med. Ctr., 13 7 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002). In Dulaney, this Court held as
follows:
The admissibility of the expert testimony is an issue that is separate and
distinct from whether that testimony is sufficient to raise genuine issues of
material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Kolln v. Saint Luke's
Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts,
125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). When considering whether the evidence
in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court
must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of
the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 942
P.2d 544 (1997) . The liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard
does not apply, however, when deciding whether or not testimony offered in
connection with a motion for summary judgment is admissible: Kolln v. Saint
Luke's Reg'[ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Rhodehouse v.
Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). The trial court must look at the
witness' affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts
which, if taken as true, would render the testimony of that witness admissible.
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). This Court reviews
challenges to the trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion
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standard. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816
(2000).

Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 163-64 (emphasis added).
This Court considers three factors in determining whether a lower court abused its
discretion: "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2)
whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal
principles, and (3) whether it reached its decision through an exercise of reason." Lepper, 160
Idaho at I 09 (internal citations omitted).

C.

Standard of review re motions for reconsideration.

This Cou1t "review[s] a district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration for an
abuse of discretion." Lepper, 160 Idaho at 112 (citing Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen, 154
Idaho 549, 554, 300 P.3d l 037, 1042(2012)).

IV.

ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Properlv Granted McDonald's Motion for Summarv
Judgment.

1.

The Fisks' standard of care experts failed to satisfy I.C §§ 6-1012 and
6-1013; further, they failed to present opinions critical of Dr.
McDonald.

Tn 1976, the Idaho legislature enacted LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. Underlying both
statutes was the unambiguous legislative intent declaring it to be in the public interest that a
health provider' s liability "be limited and made more definahle hy requirement for direct proof
of departure from a community standard of practice." Section 1, S.L. 1976, ch. 277. These
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statutes have been applied consistently for decades to require plaintiffs in medical malpractice
cases to present admissible expert testimony from an expe1i with actual knowledge of the local
standard of health care practice applicable to defendant, in opposition to a defendant's
dispositive motion. Suhadolnik v. Pressman , 151 Idaho 110,254 P.3d 11 (2011). CmTent
Idaho jurisprudence on the application of these statutes was well-stated by this Court in
following excerpt from Suhadolnik:
A precondition to the admission of testimony by a medical expert in a
malpractice case is that the expert familiarize himself with the local standard of
practice or care for the medical practice field at issue in the case. I. C § 6-1013.

***

In order to avoid summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, a
plaintiff must provide expert testimony that the defendant doctor, or other health
care provider, "negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care
practice." Dulaney, 13 7 Idaho at 164, 45 P. 3d at 820. In order for expe1i
testimony to be admissible in a medical malpractice claim, the party must
demonstrate:
(a) that such opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b)
that the expert witness can testify to the opinion with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty; ( c) that the expe1i witness possesses
professional knowledge and expertise; and (d) that the expert
witness
has
actual knowledge
of the
applicable
community standard of care to which his expert opinion
testimony is addressed.

Id. (citing LC. § 6-1013) (emphasis added). Additionally, LC. § 6-1012
defines the community standard of care as:
(a) the standard of care for the class of health care provider to
which the defendant belonged and was functioning, taking into
account the defendant's training, experience, and fields of
medical specialization, if any; (b) as such standard existed at the
time of the defendant's alleged negligence; and (c) as such
-1 5-

standard existed at the place of the defendant's alleged
negligence.

Dulaney, 137 Jdaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820 (citing I.C. § 6-1012)(intemal
citations omitted).
Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho at 114-16. In order to satisfy I.C. § 6-1013 , the expert testifying to the
standard of care "must also state how he or she became familiar with that standard of care."

Dulaney, 13 7 Idaho at 164.
A plaintiffs proffer of evidence in a medical malpractice action must further comply
with the following requires of Rule 56(e):
Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure imposes additional
requirements upon the admission of expert medical testimony submitted in
connection with a motion for summary judgment. The party offering such
evidence must show that it is based upon the witness' personal knowledge and
that it sets forth facts as would be admissible in evidence. Kolin v. Saint Luke's
Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts,
125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994) . The party offering the evidence must
also affirmatively show that the witness is competent to testify about the
matters stated in his testimony. Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho
323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208 , 868 P.2d 1224
(1994). Statements that are conclusory or speculative do not satisfy either the
requirement of admissibility or competency under Rule 56(e). Kolin v. Saint
Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Hecla Mining Co.
v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992).

Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164 (emphasis added) .6 "To avoid summary judgment for the defense
in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must offer expe1i testimony indicating that the

6

Idaho law precludes the introduction of expert opinions that are ''speculative, conclusory, or
unsubstantiated by facts in the record," since any such testimony would be "of no assistance to the
jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is inadmissible as evidence." Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho
807, 811, 979 P2d 1165, 1169 (1999). Admissibility must be based on the expert's reasoning and
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defendant health care provider negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care
practice. In order for such expert testimony to be admissible, the p/aintfff must lay the

foundatiou required by Idaho Code§ 6-1013." Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137
Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816,820 (2002) (emphasis added).
Idaho Courts have consistently found expert testimony to be inadmissible and
insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment if the same fails to comply with I.C.
§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 757 P.2d 197 (1988) (expe11
affidavit insufficient where only offering knowledge of statewide standard of care); Strode v.

Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 755 P.2d 106 (1989) (out of state expe1t not competent where relying
on national standard of care); Morrison v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., 160 Idaho

599, 605, 3 77 P .3cl 1062, 1068 (2016) (finding that mere assc11ion that the community standard
of care has been replaced by a national standard of care or statewide standard of care is
insufficient to lay the foundation for the admission of an expert's opinion).
Herc, the Fisks failed to present any expert testimony critical of Dr. McDonald in
opposition to his Motion for Summary Judgment. The District Court therefore did not abuse
its discretion in finding the Fisks ' expert testimony inadmissible relative to Dr. McDonald
under the governing pleadings.

methodology, and not the ultimate conclusion reached. Nield v. Pocate!fo Health Servs., Inc. , 156
Idaho 802, 816, 332 P.3d 714, 728 (2014) (citiv. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,140,219 P.3d 453,464
(2009)).
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As to the Fisks ' argument on appeal that Dr. McDonald should not have been dismissed
based upon Ms. Neheker 's criticism of NP Sholtz, even if this argument is entertained, its
insu1mountablc flaw is that Ms. Nekckcr failed to make a foundational showing that she was
qualified to criticize NP Sholtz.
Generally, for an out-of-area expert to show actual knowledge of the local community
standard, he or she must consult with a local specialist about tbc relevant community standard
of care. Rhodehouse, 125 Idaho 212. Ms. Nebeker, however, made no attempt to consult a
local specialist at the time judgment was entered in favor of Dr. McDonald. 7 Instead, Ms.
Neheker's declaration provided that she reviewed the medical records, depositions, and various
administrative guide1in es. (R. 1614.)
Given the Fisks ' argument on appeal that NWSH's experts could not be familiar with
the local standard of care by review of Mrs. Fisk's medical records, the Fisks conceded that
those records do not provide the basis for actual knowledge of the appl icablc standard of care. 8

Rhodehouse, 125 Idaho at 212 ("we have indicated that an expert cannot become familiar with
the local standard of care merely by reviewing hospital records and the actions of a local
physician.").

7

Neither Ms. Ncbckcr's expert report (R. 794) nor her declaration presented in opposition to Dr.
McDonald and NWSH's dispositive motions (R. 1614) contained any representation that she
contacted a local provider on the standard of care.
8
See page 35 of Appellants' Brief, representing to the Court that "Northwest [NWSH] cannot
legitimately say that the records set the local standard of care."
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The same is true with respect to the deposition testimony.

As recognized in

Rhodehouse, while it is possible for an out-of-area expert to meet the foundational
requirements of LC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 by reviewing deposition testimony when, for
instance, such testimony provides that the community standard of care is the same as a national
standard with which the out-of-area expert is familiar, this is a difficult proposition. For the
expert to succeed, the deposition "testimony must clearly articulate the local standard of care
for the particular time, place and specialty at issue in order to meet the foundational
requirements ofl.C. ~ 6-1013." Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 117-18, 254 P.3d 11

(2011) ( underlines added).
None of the deposed physicians testified that they breached the standard of care. None
of the deposed physicians testified that another physician breached the standard of care. None
of the deposed physicians articulated the standard of care applicable to any of the defendants
at the time of Mrs. Fisk's treatment. None of the deposed physicians testified that the standard
of care in the Kootenai Health community was the same as a national standard. And this is
plaintiffs' burden to show. None of their expc1is identify deposition testimony that "clearly
articulated" the community standard of care to allow them to acquire "actual knowledge" of
the same. Consequently, the depositions reviewed by plaintiffs' expc1is were inadequate to
provide them with the requisite foundational knowledge.

On appeal, the Fisks appear to

concede that the depositions reviewed by Ms. Nebeker were insufficient to supply her with the
local standard of care.
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Rather, the sole basis upon which the Fisks assert Ms. Nebeker had actual knowledge
of the local standard of care appears to rest on her review of certain administrative rules and
nursing guidelines. (R. 16 l 9, generally.) Attempting to establish foundation on th is basis is
fraught with peril.

Idaho jurisprudence soundly rejects the proposition that experts may

become familiar with the local standard of health care practice by mere review of laws,
regulations and policies (including but not limited to ID APA guidelines). 9 Schmechel v. Dille,
148 Idaho 176,183,219 P.3d 1192, 1199 (2009) (that IDAPA required a provider to have a
Delegation of Services Agreement docs not establish a standard of care or amount to
negligence per sc if such agreement were not in place); Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho
110, 117-18, 254 P.3d 11 (2011); Navo v. Bingham Mem '/ Hosp., 160 Idaho 363, 372-73, 373

P.3cl 681, 690-91(2016) (finding that regulations must "concern the 'physical administration
of health care services."') (quoting lvfattox v.

Life Care Centers of America, Inc.,

157 Idaho

468,478, 337 P.3d 627 (2014).)
The District Court recognized each of the IDAPA regulations apparently relied upon
by Ms. Nebeker, reviewed those regulations, and found that none of them identified the

9

To the extent the Appellants' Brief cites Mattox or Suhaldonik or any other case for the proposition
that an out-of-area expert may satisfy Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 by review of government
regulations, it would be error to suggest to this Court that such regulations may provide actual
knowledge of the local standard of care in and of themselves without otherwise satisfying those
sections. Even in the abstract, none of the regulations cited by Ms. Nebeker come close to setting
forth the standard of care in compliance with Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. Even if they did, however,
Ms. Nebeker would still be required to affirmatively demonstrate such standards may be used to
establish a standard of care without contravening I.C. § 6-1014 enacted in 2014.
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standard of care applicable to the alleged negligent treatment of Mrs. fisk. (R. 1829.) This
finding is self-evident from review of the standards purp01tedly relied upon by Ms. Nebeker including as summarized in pages 16 and 17 of the Appellants' Brief. These broad guidelines
are no less vague than the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm. These guidelines are bereft of any
standards by which to evaluate the standard of care required for the administration of
antiemctics, a suppository, a CT scan, a gastrointestinal consult, or endoscopy for a facility
like NvVSH, and if such arc required, when, and if so, how does the standard apply between
hospitalist, nurses and on call nurse practitioners in this setting, and how is such standard
fmther applied where, as here, the patient has no known predictive risk factors for the condition
at issue, or what other facts arc relevant to evaluate the standard of care for the post-operative
occun-ence of bowel ischcmia.

In short, from the guidelines cited by Ms. Nebeker it is

impossible, absent wild speculation, to ascertain what local standard of health care practice
applied to NWSH, its staff and nurses , NP Sholtz, Dr. McDonald, or any other person or entity
regarding Mrs. Fisk's treatment. In its discretion to deten11ine the admissibility of expert
testimony, the District Court evaluated the IDAPA and nursing standards contained in Ms.
Nebckcr' s declaration to reach a reasoned finding that none of them described the relevant
treatment of Mrs. Fisk or prescribed a standard of care to be applied for the treatment of Mrs.
Fisk.

The District Court therefore found that Ms. Nebeker failed to make the requisite

foundational showing under LC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. This evidentiary finding was wellwi thin the District Court's discretion.
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2.

McDonald did not bear an initial burden of proof to demonstrate
compliance with the local standard of care.

Recognizing her failure to provide admissible expett testimony critical of Dr.
McDonald (or NP Sholtz), Fisk argues for the first time on appeal that this Comt should, in
effect, ovc11urn l.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 - reversing an overwhelming body of ldaho
jurisprudence in the process - by requiring a malpractice defendant to show as a condition
precedent that he or she complied with the local standard of health care practice with the
suppmt of admissible expert testimony. 10

The implications of such an action would be as

drastic and far-reaching as they arc judicially unsound.
The substance of Rule 56(c) inextricably linked to and suppmted by volumes ofidaho
precedent has remained constant for generations. It provides as follows:
( c) Procedures.
(1) Supporting factual positions. A patty asse11ing that a fact cannot be or
is genially disputed must support the asse1tion by:

10

Before the Disttict Court, the Fisks merely interpreted Suhadolnik incorrectly to aq,'lle that
somehow defendants bear an "initial" burden of proof on this issue. The Fisks continue to make this
argument by misinterpreting Suhadolnik. For the first time on appeal, however, they argue that the
proffer of evidenced compelled by Rule 56(c) and LC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 - that a plaintiff to a
medical malpractice case must produce admissible evidence to support the elements of its case, i.e.,
the foundation for expert testimony under Section 6-1013 -is a recent rule that sprung from Foster
v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005) and was implicitly overruled by Mattox v. Life Care
Centers of America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 337 P.3d 627 (2014). Dr. McDonald does not track this
argument. Neither decision overrules the language of Rule 56 or abrogates LC. §§ 6-1012 and 61013 or overturns the volume of cases applying them consistently to a malpractice plaintiffs
evidentiary burden on summary judgment.
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(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence
or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
LR.C.P. 56(c)(l)(B) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Dr. McDonald complied with
Rule 56 by asse1iing that none of the Fisks' experts could produce admissible evidence to
support the Fisks claim that he was negligent. (And as recognized by the District Comi, none
of the Fisks ' experts were critical of Dr. McDonald.) To avoid summary judgment, the Fisks
were compelled to 'make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to [the Fisks '] case on which [they] will bear the burden of proof at trial." Thomson v. Idaho

Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994) (citing Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). The Fisks asserted a single cause of action against Dr.
McDonald - that he negligently treated Mrs. Fisk and therefore "violated the standard of care
as described in LC.§ 6-1012." (R. 17, Complaint, paragraph 47.) LC.§ 6-1012 sets forth the
essential elements of such cause of action as follows , in relevant paii:
§ 6-1012. Proof of community standard of health care practice in
malpractice case

In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person,
brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of health care ...
on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care or on account of
any matter incidental or related thereto, such claimant or plaintiff must, as an
essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert
testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such
defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of
health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or
should have been provided, as such standard existed at the time and place of the
alleged negligence of such physician and surgeon, hospital or other such health
care provider and as such standard then and there existed with respect to the
-23-

class of health care provider that such defendant then and there belonged to and
in which capacity he, she or it was functioning. Such individual providers of
health care shall be judged in such cases in comparison with similarly trained
and qualified providers of the same class in the same community, taking into
account his or her training, experience, and fields of medical specialization, if
any. If there be no other like provider in the community and the standard of
practice is therefore indeterminable, evidence of such standard in similar Idaho
communities at said time may be considered. As used in this act, the term
"community" refers to that geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed
general hospital at or nearest to which such care was or allegedly should have
been provided.
I.C. § 6-1012 (emphasis added). To "affinnatively prove by direct expert testimony" that Dr.
McDonald "negligent failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the
community in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided . . ." under I.C.
§ 6-1012, the Fisks ' experts needed to satisfy the foundational requirements of I.C. § 6-1013,
providing as follows:
§ 6-1013. Testimony of expert witness on community standard

The applicable standard of practice and such a defendant's failure to meet said
standard must be established in such cases by such a plaintiff by testimony of
one (1) or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses, and such expert
testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation therefor is first
laid, establishing (a) that such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness,
(b) that the said opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical ce1iainty,
and (c) that such expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise
coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to
which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed; provided, this section
shall not be construed to prohibit or otherwise preclude a competent expert
witness who resides elsewhere from adequately familiarizing himself with the
standards and practices of (a particular) such area and thereafter giving opinion
testimony in such a trial.
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LC.§ 6-1013 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has applied the plain language of
these statutes consistently for decades to require a nonmoving plaintiff to provide admissible
expe11 testimony on the local standard of care - the essential element of a plaintiff's
malpractice case - irrespective of whether the moving defendant affirmatively disproves the
element with admissible expe1t testimony. 11
The Fisks fail to present a legitimate argument as to why or how this Court could
ovc1tum the clear and unambiguous requirements of LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. If it is too
much to require a plaintiff to present admissible expert testimony on an essential clement of
their claim on summary judgment, would the defendant be forced to wait until trial to
understand the foundation for such expe1t's testimony? Per the Fisks' rationale, even a motion

in liminc or other pretrial motion, for instance, to exclude testimony of expe1ts who disregard
expeit disclosures, discovery requests or Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) showing in a pretrial order would

first require the moving party to affirmatively demonstrate that he or she did not fail to satisfy

11

The following are but a few cases in which the Idaho Appellate Courts have affinned summary
judgment entered in favor of a defendant who did not support his or her dispositive motion with expert
testimony: Frank v. East Shoshone Ilosp., 114 Idaho 480, 482, 757 P.2d 1199 (1988) (finding "[i[t
is not an overly burdensome requirement to have an expert become familiar with the standard of care
in the community where alleged malpractice is committed."); Kunz v. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130, 795
P.2d 24 (l 990); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 P.3d 533 (2007) (affirming dismissal of
medical defendant and expressly finding that a plaintiff's expert's conclusory allegation that he or she
is "familiar with the standard of care" applicable to defendant, does not shift the burden to defendant
to show the contrary).

-25-

an element of proof for a claim upon which plaintiff bears the burden of proof a trial. That
would contravene bedrock principles of the allocation of the burden of proof.

3.

lC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013,for better or worse, are the law of the land.

The Appellate Brief devotes a good deal of time and effo1t toward the perceived
unfairness of LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. Be that as it may - and certainly fair minds may
disagree on this subject - this legislation remains good law. This Court recently stated that it
''can conceive of no principles of law that are more plain or obvious than these: (1) it is the
province of the Legislature to make and amend laws; and (2) this Court is without authority to
amend laws enacted by the Legislature because we think them unwise." Hoffer v. Shappard,
160 Idaho 868,380 P.3d 681 (2016) (rev'd inpait after holding ofl.C. § 12-121 was abrogated
by revised statute).12
The Idaho Legislature duly enacted I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and the Idaho Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that their foundational clements must be shown by a plaintiff
required to demonstrate such foundation as an essential element of his or her case. Therefore,
this Court is bound to stare decisis unless the precedent has proven manifestly unjust or

12

In Hoffer, the dissent saw no reason to overturn a vast body of law by the majority's decision to
repeal Ruic 54(e )(2) given that while it is the Legislature's prerogative to pass fee statutes, such did
not restrict "'[t]hc inherent power of the Supreme Court to make mles governing procedure in all the
courts of Idaho .. ." ' See dissent in Hoffer, 160 Idaho at 884 (citing I.C. § 1-212). Here, the Fisks
arc also asking the Court to ovc1tum a ''vast body of Idaho law" yet unlike in context ofthe legislation
at issue in Hoffer, there is no conflict between the applicable statute and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure (compare Rule 56 and I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 with Rule 54(e)(2) and the version of
~ 12-121 in effect at the time Hoffer was decided). (Burdick, J. dissenting.)
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unworkable.

Hoffer, 160 Idaho at 883 ("[s]tare decisis requires that this Court follow

'controlling precedent unless that precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be
unjust or unwise, or ovem11ing that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice."') (citing State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4-5,
343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015).)
Should there come a day this Court contemplates upending Idaho ' s Medical
Malpractice Act by fiat, it must be on a record where the appellant has made the argument
before the district comt and supported it with a detailed review of the Act's legislative history,
application of the Act across the decades in which it has been law, and appropriate anecdotal
and empirical evidence in the record. Here, the Fisks merely dislike that the Legislature has
endeavored to shield, at least partially, medical providers from the exorbitant costs of
administering health care services in Idaho and the United States - where the cost of health
care related services constitutes almost 20% of the United States' Gross Domestic Product because it creates an cvidentiary burden for medical plaintiffs that is trying, yet hardly
insum1ountable. There appears to be no occasion in the history of Idaho jurisprudence where
the Supreme Court has overturned a duly enacted statute, the applied effect of which being
intended by the Legislature, simply because it is undesirable to a group of citizens who could
effectuate the same change requested here at the ballot box.
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4.

The Supreme Court has already ameliorated J.C §'§ 6-1012 and 61013 's burden on plaintiffs by loosening what is required to show the
local standard ofpractice is indeterminable.

A plaintiff may present expert testimony without actual knowledge of the local standard

of care if he or she shows there is " no other like provider in the community and the standard
of practice is therefore indete1minable .. ." I.C. § 6-1012. This Court has relaxed this language

by ruling that a standard is indeterminable where there is no medical provider in the local
community willing to consult with a plaintiff's expert Lepper v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 160
Idaho 104, 369 P.3d 882, 893 (2016). This prevents the injustice perceived by the Fisks in
their Brief by allowing plaintiff to make a foundational showing in the event the local providers
arc unwilling to consult with his or her expert.

And plaintiffs frequently rely upon this

indeterrninability provision to make a successful foundational showing to avoid summary
judgment.
B.

Fisk's Motion for Reconsideration was Properlv Denied.

The Fisks' Brief con-cctly recites that the District Court treated her Motion for
Reconsideration as a motion under Rule 59(e) and 60(b), not a motion under Ruic 11.2 (an
inelevant detail, as discussed below). The Fisks' Brief inconectly recites, however, that the
District Court failed to consider the "new" evidence in support of her motion to reconsider the
judgment dismissing McDonald with prejudice. To the contrary, the District Court clarified
as follows:
. .. The Court has reviewed the new affidavits. The Court is persuaded for the
same reasons set forth by the Hospital: these new affidavits and new arguments
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regarding those affidavits do not change this Court's decision on summary
judgment. . .the Fisks failed to present admissible evidence reflecting actual
knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice as required by
LC. § 6-1012 and LC. § 6-1013. Def. North Idaho Day Surgery, LLC, d/b/a
Northwest Specialty Hospital's Opp 'n to Plts' Mot. For Recons. Re: Northwest
Specialty Hospital, 3-27. The Court agrees with all arguments presented by the
Hospital in that brief.
This Court finds, from a factual standpoint, that Fisks have presented no
new evidence to support their motion to reconsider. This Court agrees with the
Hospital's argument that Nebeker's new Declaration does not provide the ANA
guidelines for this Court to review to determine whether those guidelines
provide some cognizable standard applicable to this case (Id.) 3); does not
provide any testimony by Nurse Miller (Id.); and provides no admissible
evidence reflecting actual knowledge of the local standard of care through
familiarizing sources (Id. 18-24).
(R. 2171) (emphasis added.)
For the reason stated below, the District Court correctly treated the Fisks' Motion for
Reconsideration as a Rule 59( e) and 60(b) motion. Even if the District Court should have
reviewed their motion under Rule 11.2; however, the result would be unchanged given that the
Fisks ' "new" evidence failed to present admissible testimony on the local standard of health
care practice applicable to Dr. McDonald (or NP Sholtz). Thus, such error was harmless.
I.R.C.P. 61.

1.

The District Court applied the appropriate standard of review.

As noted by the District Court:

"The entire focus by the Fisks in their short

memorandum regarding Dr. McDonald is 'evidence' they claim supports the assertion that Dr.
McDonald was Sholtz' s supervisor. [R. 1991.] Mem. In Supp. of Pls.' Mot for Recons.: Def.
Jeffrey D. McDonald, 1-4;" yet as the District Court observed in both of its decisions, the
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Complaint alleged negligence and a cause of action against Dr. McDonald, but it did not allege
NP Sholtz was negligent, it did not allege Dr. McDonald was her employer or responsible for
her conduct, and it did not allege that Dr. McDonald's cause of action was in any way linked
to or arising from NP Sholtz's conduct. (R. 2171.)

In short, the Complaint was patently

defective to support the Fisks' vicarious liability theory even if it could and should have been
pied properly. The Fisks' motion for reconsideration effectively sought relief that would result
in new claims against Dr. McDonald, thus the District Comi correctly treated it as Rule 59(c)
and 60(b) motion. 13
As such, the Fisks were required to support their motion to reconsider the dismissal of
Dr. McDonald with a showing of good cause. As stated in Lowe v. Lym, I 03 Idaho 259, 646
P.2d 1030 (Ct.App. 1982):
Where ... the motion for "reconsideration" raises new issues, or presents
new information, not addressed to the court prior to the decision which resulted
in the judgment, the proper analogy is to a motion for relief from j udgrnent under
Rule 60(6). That rule requires a showing of good cause and specifies particular
grounds upon which relief may be afforded. Hendrickson v. Sun Valley
Cmporation, Inc., 98 Idaho 133, 559 P.2d 749 (1977). As with Rule 59(c)
proceedings, the 1ight to grant, or deny, relief under the provisions of Rule 60(b)
is a discretionary one with the trial com1. Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414,
599 P.2d 985 (1979).

13

The Fisks' new and unpled theory against Dr. McDonald was not a proper basis for reconsideration
of the District Court's entry of sutmnary judgment in favor of Dr. McDonald in the first place. Kelly
v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523-24, 236 P .3d 1277 (2010) ("It is clearly established under Idaho law that
a 'cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor
may it be considered for the first time on appeal.'") (citing Maroun v. Wyreless 5'.ys. Inc., 141 Idaho
604,613, 114 P.3d 974,983 (2005) (further internal citation omitted).
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Lowe, 103 Idaho at 263 (affirming lower court's decision that buyers fo.iled to show good cause
for the submission of new information following award of summary judgment in favor of
seller). "A trial court's disposition of a ... Rule 60(b) motion will be upheld unless the court
has manifestly abused the wide discretion vested in it." Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733,
743, 132 P.3d 1261, 1271 (Ct.App. 2006). The same is tmc for a decision on a Rule 59(e)
motion. Pandrea, 160 Idaho at 170-71.
The same is also tme for a motion for reconsider brought after entry of judgment
pursuant to Rule 11.2. The judgment entered in favor of Dr. McDonald was preceded by the
judgment in favor of the remaining original defendants NWHS and Dr. Pennings.
Consequently, it was a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54. Rule 54 makes a distinction
between paiiial and final judgments, where the former " may be revised at any time" before
entry of final judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l). Rules 59(e) and 60(a) apply to request to modify
final judgments. Implicit to Rule 11.2 (consistent with Rule 54(b)(l)) is that motions for
reconsideration of an order before entry of final judgment are revisable at any time and in the
context of Rule 56 motions, the lower court should review evidence submitted by a non moving

party to show a question of fact. Further implicit to Rule 11.2 (consistent with Rules 59(e) and
60(b)), however, is that motions for reconsideration of an order after entry of final judgment
do not require the lower court to consider new evidence unless the moving party shows good
cause as to why such evidence was not submitted prior to the entry of final judgment. This
approach applies Ruic 11.2 for motions brought suhsequent to a final judgment consistently
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with the Rules 54(h), 59(e) and 60(b), and is further consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Proccdurc. 14 After final judgment is entered, a Rule 11.2 motion must therefore be supported
by good cause.

15

The Fisks' moving papers were devoid of a statement of good cause, with the Fisks
believing (and continuing to believe) that such showing was unnecessary. The failure to show,
let alone assert, good cause is fatal on appeal.
Nonetheless, no good cause existed. The Fisks declined to seek a continuance under
Rule 56(d) at any time after Dr. McDonald and the Hospital moved for summary judgment.
They declined a continuance even when asked by the District Court at the time of the hearing

for a last-ditch effort to reconnoiter their approach prior to the entry of judgment in favor of
Dr. McDonald. The Fisks left no stone unturned during discovery: in 2017, they completed
comprehensive written discovery and the depositions of numerous parties and witnesses; there
were no discovery disputes, motions to compel or other circumstances to frustrate their ability
to obtain information necessaiy to prosecute their case and obtain expert testimony by the

14

Pandrea, 160 Idaho at 17l (a lower court's denial of a Rule 59 motion is "appealable," but only
on the questions of whether there has been a manifest abuse of discretion." (internal citations
omitted); Blair v. Schwan Food Co., 454 F.d 553, 555 (9 th Cir. 2011) applying Fe<l. R. Civ. P.
59(e), such motion "should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district
court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear enor, or if there is an
intervening change in the controlling law." (citing 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 1 79 F.3d
656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)).
15

Nothing in Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'[ Bank, 118 Idaho 812(1990), or other authorities
cited in Appellants' Brief is to the contrary,

-32-

January 16, 2018 disclosure deadline; the "discoverable" facts in the case were hardly complex
or convoluted; they did not take issue with Respondents ' expc11 witness disclosures; and the
Fisks were afforded multiple opportunities to retain experts to support their case. Therefore,
they had every opportunity to raise the issues brought in their motion for reconsideration at the
time the District Court heard Dr. McDonald's motion for summary judgment. The District
Court did not abuse its discretion in therefore finding the fisks lacked good cause to support
their motion for reconsideration.

2.

Even without the good cause standard, the Fisks' "new" evidence did
not comply with LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, rendering the standard of
review applied by the District Court immaterial.

In moving to reconsider the judgment entered in favor of Dr. McDonald, the Fisks did
not dispute that none of their experts were critical of Dr. McDonald. Therefore, their motion
to reconsider implicitly acknowledged that judgment in favor of Dr. McDonald was proper
based upon the pleadings. On appeal, the Fisks do not assc11 that their experts were critical of
Dr. McDonald. Their only contention is that Dr. McDonald is liable for NP Sholtz based upon
the testimony of Ms. Nebeker. Even if this theory was properly pied, this argument fails
because the "new" evidence Fisks presented in their motion to reconsider suffered from the
same defect as the evidence submitted in opposition to Respondents' dispositive motions - it
failed to demonstrate Ms. Nebeker had actual knowledge of the local standard of practice
applicable to Respondents or to NP Sholtz.
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In their motion to reconsider, they made no et1ort to parse or challenge the District
Court's finding that Ms. Nebeker failed to demonstrate actual knowledge of the local standard
of care (see R. 1864-1867); the Fisks did not dispute the legal authority cited in the MSJ Order
or the Respondents ' underlying dispositi ve motions; and even with the purported "new"
evidence, the Fisks again fail to show that Ms. Nebeker had actual knowledge of the local
standard of care applicable to an on-call NP like Ms. Sholtz who practiced in the area served
by Kootenai Health in March of 2015.
Relative to Dr. McDonald, the "new" evidence consisted of a Second Declaration of
Suzanne Nebeker that merely repeated the same conclusory statements contained in Ms.
Nebeker' s report and prior declaration. It asse1ied the acts and omissions of the Hospital, its
staff and nurses, NP Sholtz, and a non-party intensivist cumulatively resulted in the delay of
treatment that contributed to Mrs. Fisk's adverse outcome without adequately describing the
standard of care of care applicable to each provider, how Ms. Nebeker became familiar with
such standards of care, how Ms. Nebeker has actual knowledge of such standards of care, and
how such standards of care applied to the course ofJ\..1rs. Fisk's treatment.
Other than summarizing her prior declaration, report and reciting unhelpful regulatory
guidelines, Ms. Nebeker 's second declaration attempted to demonstrate actual knowledge of
the local standard of care by reference to a telephone conversation with Jackie Wagner, FNP
in Coeur d'Alene, Holly Moore, FNP in Coeur d'Alene, and Ms. Odom, Associate for the
Executive Director for the ldaho Board of Nursing (located in Boise) (R. 1950-1951). For an
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out-of-area expert to acquire familiarity with the local standard of care by communication with
a local specialist, he or she must demonstrate that "the local specialist has actual knowledge
of the local standard of care." Dulaney, 137 Tdaho at 166-67. As shown from the excerpt of
the Recon. Order recited above, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Ms. Nebeker failed to identify what infonnation the individuals with whom she spoke
conveyed with respect to the standard of care applicable to NP Sholtz (or any other provider),
whether those persons had actual knowledge of the local standard of care applicable to Dr.
McDonald, NWSH, its staff and nurses, NP Sholtz, or the non-party intensivist. 16

Ms.

Nebekcr's second declaration left the District Court no choice but to speculate as to the
substance of those conversations. Rule 59(e) and I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 do not allow, let
alone require, trial courts to speculate on the admissibility of expert testimony, and the District
Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Ms. Nebekcr' s second declaration lacked
foundation to be admissible.

17

16

The District Court did not consider, or need to consider, Ms. Wagner's testimony that in her
conversation with Ms. Nebeker, she (1) was not provided sufficient factual or clinical context to state
what a particular medical provider should or should not have done under circumstances similar to the
treatment of Mrs. Fisk; (2) that she did not identify to Ms. Nebeker the standard or custom of health
care practice applicable to on-call nurse practitioners as that standard existed in the area served by the
Hospital in March of2015; (3) and that her statements to Ms. Nebeker otherwise did not identify the
standard of health care practice applicable to any health care provider. (R. 2073-2074.)
17

This Court has addressed the continuum of communications necessary to show whether an out-ofarea expert has satisfied or has failed to satisfy LC. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 based upon a consult with
a local provider. At a minimum, the Court has required the expert consulted to himself be familiar
with the applicable local standard of care and for the out-of-area expert to identify such. In Arregui
v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,291 P.3d 1000 (2012), the plaintiff retained Dr. Tamai, an out-of-35-

V.

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, Respondent Dr. McDonald respectfully requests this Court
to affirm the decisions below and award him costs and attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 14th day of August, 2019.
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS LLP
By

Isl Michael E. Ramsden
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Respondent Jeffrey McDonald, MD

town chiropractor. Dr. Tamai inquired into the local standard of care by speaking with a local
chiropractor who practiced in the relevant community at the relevant time, professed familiarity with
the local standard of care and informed the out-of-town expert that it was identical to the standard
upon which the out-of-town chiropractor based her opinions. Relying on Dulaney, the lower comi
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the
plaintiff "merely asked the district court to believe Dr. Tamai's conclusory statements that the local
unidentified chiropractor was familiar with the standard of care and because Dr. Tamia spoke with
him, she was also familiar with the local standard of care. Such meager information is insufficient."
Id. at 809 (emphasis added); see also Navo v. Bingham Mem 'l Hosp., 373 P.3d 681 (2016) (expert
did not provide a foundation of"actual knowledge" of the local community standard of care a hospital
and its nurse notwithstanding acknowledging in his rep01i that he had "spoken with Judith Nagel, RN,
Associate Director of Idaho State Board of Nursing ... to affirm that the community standards in
rural hospitals in Idaho regarding nurse anesthesia programs is similar to standards in place across the
country" with which he was familiar.); Keyser v. Garner, 129 Idaho 112, 922 P.2d 409 (Ct. App.
1997) ("In all the reported Idaho appellate decisions holding the foundational standards to be satisfied,
the outside expert testified that there existed a national or regional standard of care with which the
expert was already familiar and that the applicable community standard did not deviate from that
national or regional standard."); Cf Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341,346, 870 P.2d 1300, 1305 (1994)
(out-of-area expert satisfied standard of care applicable to Wallace, Idaho dentists by consulting with
a local Wallace dentist who opined that almost every dentist in the area had been using Sargenti Paste
during the 1970s through mid-1980s and that use of the Sargenti method was within the standard of
care at the time of the 1984 incident); Dunlap by & ex rel. Dunlap v. Garner, 127 Idaho 599,903
P.2d 1296 (1994) (plaintiffs expert demonstrated knowledge of the local standard of care for
defendant-obstetrician s practice in Burley, Idaho, by consulting with two separate Burley physicians
in regard to the obstetrical issues that arose in the particular case to gain actual knowledge that the
standard of obstetrical care in Burley was the same as for everywhere else in the United States).
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